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therefore, ideas, which are subject to the temporal
flow, do not seem to be able to absolutely repeat
themselves (CP 6.132). Ideas emergent in temporal
process are always gone and thus not equivalent to
each other. The issue then, is how the connection of a
past idea and something that is immediately present
to consciousness is possible.
One of the problems that ensue from this problem
is the possibility of knowledge. Human beings, as
well as other organisms that have consciousness, live
in the continuous process that flows from past events
to the present consciousness. The process of gaining
knowledge is based on the secure connection between
past ideas and something present to our
consciousness. Without the connection of the past
ideas and the present, knowledge could never be
possible. To keep past ideas from delusion, Peirce
demands that there must be a necessary connection
between ideas that are continuous in the temporal
flow (CP 6.108). In order to have knowledge in the
flux of time, for Peirce, we should be conscious of a
real interval of time that gives ‘continuity’ to ideas
(CP 6.110). Peirce, however, does not introduce a
finite interval of time in his discussion of continuity.
According to Peirce, the present is connected with the
past by a series of real infinitesimal steps (CP 6.110).
Peirce suggests that only in an infinitesimally spread-
out interval, can we immediately perceive the
beginning, middle and end of the temporal sequence
(CP 6.111). In this rather mathematical way, a past
idea can be continuous to the present.3
In my estimation, however, Peirce’s theory of
determination reveals the determinate process
embedded in an idea as a continuum and we can
glance at the theory from his mention of three
elements of an idea. According to Peirce, a
continuum of an idea consists of three discriminate
elements. As he puts it:
Three elements go to make up an idea. The first
is its intrinsic quality as a feeling. The second
is the energy with which it affects other ideas,
an energy which is infinite in the here-and-
nowness of immediate sensation, finite and
relative in the recency of the past. The third
element is the tendency of an idea to bring
along other ideas with it (CP 6.135).
Thus, the three elements of ideas are ‘quality as a
feeling,’ ‘the energy in immediate sensation,’ and
‘connection of ideas.’ Quality of feeling, which is a
first in Peircean categories, is subjective extension
(CP 6.133). Feelings in themselves do not make any
continuum. As time flows, or as processes are
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1. Introduction
In ‘The Law of Mind’ (1892), Charles Peirce tries to
scrutinize the general law of mental action (CP
6.103).1 Peirce clearly mentions that, in ‘The Law of
Mind,’ he concentrates more on ‘continuity,’ in
Peirce’s terminology ‘synechism,’ than ‘spontaneity,’
or ‘tychism’ (CP 6.103).2 Peirce’s interest is thus
revealed in his articulation of the law of mind that
ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect
certain others which stand to them in a peculiar
relation of affectibility. In this spreading they
lose intensity, and especially the power of
affecting others, but gain generality and
become welded with other ideas (CP 6.104, my
emphasis).
It is notable, more than the laws themselves, that,
after summarizing the general laws of mind, Peirce’s
articulation of continuity is extended to ‘a particular
phenomenon which is remarkably prominent in our
own consciousness, […] personality’ (CP 6.155).
My main attempt in this paper is to delve into
Peirce’s idea of ‘personality’ in ‘The Law of Mind’
from the stance of the general law of mental
phenomena. To this end, I will start from Peirce’s
concept of continuity as revealed in ‘The Law of
Mind’ and then turn to his ‘theory of determination,’
which, in my consideration, is the backbone of
Peirce’s philosophy. Finally, I will examine insights
into Peirce’s concept of ‘personality’ that can be
derived from the theory.
2. The Continuity in ‘The Law of Mind’
In ‘The Law of Mind,’ indeed, in Peirce’s entire
Philosophy, the quest for the structure of meaningful
experience prevails regarding the topic of continuity.
Peirce notably concerns himself with the question of
how a past idea can be present in the irreversible flow
of time (CP 6.107). In reality, a flow of time itself
does not allow any connection between ideas,
because time is ‘the universal form of change,’ and,
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unfolded, the energy of affection, which seems
equivalent to a second, is rapidly decreased (CP
6.135). But the energy of affection transforms its
power into connections of ideas with other ideas,
which is a third. Basically, an idea is a continuum of
feelings where ‘[i]nstantaneous feelings flow
together’ (CP 6.151). For Peirce, a living idea is
hence a continuum of feeling in which ideas influence
each other (CP 6.153) and ideas are ‘living realities’
(CP 6.152) that eventually consist of connections of
ideas.
3. A Preliminary Research on Peirce’s Theory of
Determination
It seems evident that Peirce started his investigation
into determination in his exploration of theory of
signs, which he calls semiotics. Peirce’s inquiry into
the fundamental characteristic of determination in his
early years can be associated with his effort to give a
Kantian answer to this problem in his ‘On a New List
of Categories’ (1867). As he puts it: ‘The unity to
which the understanding reduces impressions is the
unity of the proposition’ (W 2: 49).4 But the process
of moving from ‘precision’5 to the conceptions or
categories in Peirce’s account is different from Kant.6
The reason is that Kant’s determination is the process
of determining an object for a subject, and the subject
is the only agent of determination. He restricts the
work of determination to that which is always carried
out by the subject, even when that which is
determined is also only the subject (as in Kant’s
conception of reflective judgment).7 In a similar
context, Kant includes an idea of purposiveness in the
process of subjective determination.8 Such
purposiveness is a subjective principle that does not
have any power over particular forms of nature; our
feeling of purposiveness is a feeling that has
influence only on the subject. Kant’s process of
determination is thus an interpretive process solely
dependent upon subjective powers regardless of the
object before the perceiver.
Unlike Kant, Peirce thinks that the determination
works in two ways. One way is the path from being to
substance described by Peirce as that from a ‘ground’
to the relation with a correlate, and from the relation
to an ‘interpretant’ which is the mediating
representation. The ground thus determines its
relation which, with the ground, determines its
interpretant. Another way runs from interpretant
through the ground. An interpretant, which is a
Thirdness in his categories, presupposes the reference
or relation, which is a Secondness, and the reference
presupposes quality or a ground, which is a Firstness.
Peirce’s conception of determination is hence not the
one-way determination that Kant assumes in his
articulation from ground to consequence.9 As
functions of semiosis,10 the object determines the sign
which determines an interpretant, while an
interpretant also presupposes reference and object
(CP 2.92; 2.292).11 I would call the former, from
object to interpretant, ‘objectification’ and the latter,
from interpretant to object, ‘subjectificaiton,’ which
is definitely beyond Peirce’s terminology.
My main assumption about Peirce’s intention in
his theory of determination is that all modes of
determination include both activity and passivity in
the process of meaning and creating. Meaning,
including knowledge, is created by two determinative
processes. If we trace the path of determination from
the object to the interpretant, we will find out that the
object has ‘intelligibility’ in its own right, which
involves both passive and active processes. The
object is thus not devoid of subjectivity. The
determination of the object is the process by way of
which it becomes cognizable for us. Therefore,
whereas Kant has a profound logic in which the
subject determines all the predicates, Peirce has a
semiotics in which the object determines the
interpretant, providing external standard of judging as
well as internal preservation of meaning.
Another point that demands attention is that
Peirce’s theory of determination from the semiotic
perspective successfully elaborates the very nature of
‘interpretation.’  As  Gérard  Deledalle  claims,  the
process of ‘interpretation’ includes ‘the sign’s
meaning,’ which is precisely the interpretant, in
Peirce’s semiotics.12 In the interpretational process,
being itself sign, the interpretant subsists in virtue of
another interpretant. This is ‘an open-ended chain of
interpretants,’ which is a process of creativity
‘dependent upon the potential creativity of the
interpretant.’13 This chain of interpretants is the
interpretative process itself that stands for the
determinative process of signs through mediation.
4. Two Determinative Processes: Semiotics and
Epistemology
It should be noted that Peirce’s semiotics represents
one kind of determination, even though it involves
two-way determinative processes,14 and that his
theory of determination requires a comparison to his
epistemology, which for him is another branch of
determination. Peirce thus considered two processes
of determination, one from object to interpretant, and
the other from idea to mind.
In the first branch of determination, a successful
occasion of semiosis proceeds from object to
interpretant, as mentioned above. This is ‘extensional
thinking,’ which I called ‘objectification.’ As shown
in Figure 1 below, the extensional process proceeds
from object to interpretant until it succeeds in its
determination. This process of determination consists
of an infinite chain of references, where each has its
predecessor. For this reason, Peirce’s semiotics is
spatial. In other words, in this determinative process,
references are reversible, and infinitely re-
arrangeable, in the presentational space.15
Peirce’s epistemology, on the other hand,
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characteristics of each should be handled with caution
in terms of ‘time’ and ‘space.’ In the case of
semiotics, the entire process consists of an infinite
chain of determination. The whole, however, can be
defined by any lesser semiotic process that belongs to
the whole. In other words, the whole is present
wherever we are now and that is the point to which
any included chain leads. At any place in the chain,
therefore, every reference that has ever succeeded
becomes a sign of the determination of the next
interpretant, as well as the present interpretant which
is successfully determined by the sign. In such cases,
we assume that the sign was successfully determined
by the object. Since we could go all the way back to
any point in the chain, we could take a certain length
of chain as a whole. This is how the ‘spatial
presentation’ works. Because all that falls within the
limits of length of chain is simultaneously available
in the present moment, and because the present
moment contains everything that happened before,
we have the presentational space that can be defined
as a whole. It is beneficial to quote Peirce’s
hypothesis about space here: ‘space is that form of
intuition in which is presented the law of the mutual
reaction of those objects whose mode of existence
consists in mutually reacting’ (CP 6.82). Our agency
in such a presentational space operates in terms of
semiosis and, for that reason, these presentational
spaces hold many occurrences of semiosis. In the
presentational space, we can thus select our own
semiosis, since each involves the successful
interpretant determined by a sign. Any selected
semiosis includes every operational piece we want to
include, regardless of whether it is in the role of sign,
or interpretant, or object. In Peirce’s view, this
operation is ‘mutual determination’ among signs, as
Peirce summarizes this feature of space as its
represents ‘intensional thinking,’ which I called
‘subjectification’ above. The intensional work of the
mind is temporal and real. The epistemological
process of determination is therefore temporal and
irreversible. Unlike extensional processes, this
process of determination cannot move backward
against the temporal flow. A point that needs our
attention is that, in the epistemological process of
determination, abstraction is real. In other words, the
process of moving from idea to mind is what we
really experience. Our way of getting meaningful
knowledge and growth can be explained through this
temporal process. Thus we begin to see the distinction
emerge between the semiotic process and the
processes of mind. We may now introduce a
distinction between sign processes and knowledge
processes. We should, however, keep in mind that,
though these processes are distinguishable, they are
symbiotic and interpenetrating.
As Figure 1 shows, the semiotic process enables
us to classify reference and extension according to an
infinite chain of determinations, each proceeding
from object to interpretant, meanwhile the effect of
semiosis is experiential and accumulates meaningful
relations through time. It is from the latter
determinations that we build our knowledge. Still it is
important to remember that problems may emerge in
either or both processes, spoiling our efforts to make
meaningful inferences and/or successful references.
Peirce is concerned with the former meaningful
inferences in his illustrations of science, whereas he
is concerned more with the latter successful reference
in his extensive work on science. The categories, of
course, apply equally to both aspects of inquiry.
It is legitimate to question how the two
determinative processes unfold. It is true that the two
processes are different in their nature and the
Figure 1. The Processes of Semiotics and Epistemology
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sportings’ of the world when they come into relation
with one another; when such activity forms a relation,
then these relations are less abstract things relative to
the semiotic space. But still they are abstractions
relative to what Peirce calls Mind. Thus, ideas are
historical, not relational. It is therefore absurd, for
Peirce, that anyone should suppose that ideas are
unintelligible and that any attempt to discern them,
including language, leads to illusion. Unlike Hegel,
Peirce thinks the flux at the beginning is not an
abstract idea but the ‘disorganized feeling.’ After the
beginning, there arises a feeling’s of the other feeling.
It is notable that Peirce sees such ‘feeling of feeling’
as the minimum temporal unit that is required for
intelligibility. In the moment when a feeling feels the
other, nothing is intelligible until we have a moment
that is permanently placed and utterly irreversible in
the mutually felt relation between feelings. The
chaotic feeling is in relation as soon as the mutual
relation starts. The moment of each feeling of the
other is the ‘beginning’ and that is a ‘living idea.’17
The minimum unit of time thus exists, for Peirce, as
one gets the first instances of it. The feeling and felt
relation is a mutual relation that does not allow
reversibility, since each holds the other responsible.
It is true that for Peirce, beyond this responsible
mutual relation, there is nothing intelligible. It is a
mutual response in the sense that the other feeling’s
the first is a responsible response to the second
feeling feeling the other. In this way, mutual response
is necessary for accountability and also temporality.
The chaotic flux of feeling itself is not mutually
accountable and thus not part of time. Whatever is
mutually felt by another can be shared as mutually
felt and endures. Any experience that does not rely on
this mutuality eventually comes to nothing.
Interestingly enough, Peirce’s idea of temporality
above seems to lead to a two-fold conclusion. On the
one hand, his idea of temporality is not idealistic in
Hegel’s sense, because the Idea, or more accurately,
ideas are located squarely in the intelligible world
even though they require mutuality. On the other
hand, Peirce’s view seems idealistic in the sense that
something that is part of the flux and does not become
the part of our intelligible world comes to nothing.
For Peirce, the flux itself is not time, since time is
solely constituted by enduring mutuality, i.e.,
responsibility. The second conclusion needs to be
discussed.
The essence of idealistic conceptions of time is
that temporality is the form that enables our
experience of time, rather than the reality that we
experience. Peirce’s doctrines of the universe are not
merely ‘meta-physical;’ they aim at ‘metaphysical’
foundations of our real experience. In the Peircean
scheme, our experience in the universe is subject to
the doctrines of the universe. A point worthy of
attention regarding this issue is that Peirce
presupposes an ‘absolute First;’ as he says, ‘a truth
continuity and independency (CP 6.82). In the realm
of semiosis, we have continuous space where every
object in it independently reacts upon all the others.
In the case of epistemology (see the right side of
Figure 1), the limit, from the perspective of
knowledge, is the opinion to which ideally situated
inquirers in the infinitely distant future are destined to
agree. This is the epistemologically stipulated limit of
the ‘whole,’ since the flow of time to the infinitely
distant future is not reversible and the distant future
contains the whole past within itself. The
epistemological determination is thus attainable not
in the present but in the infinite future. This feature of
the epistemological process genuinely reflects the
temporality of the process. For Peirce, at the
beginning, all the promise of determination resides in
one thought,16 which is the formal way to define the
metaphysical whole for the sake of finite knowledge,
if that can be done. The universe unfolds itself from
pure flux and, as the universe is unfolded, mind is
created. The incarnation of mind is thus the beginning
of total shift from the space of presentation, in which
semiotic processes dominate inquiry, to the
physicality in which ideas become mind.
5. Temporality and Determination
Now, Peirce’s distinction between semiotic space and
epistemological space should be clearer; the semiotic
space has infinite limiting possibilities, conditioned
by the act of selection in the present, while the
epistemological space does not have any exclusive
limit. It is not clear, however, that Peirce considers
both of these processes wholly subject to, or wholly
determined by temporality. One is apt to assume that
time should be continuous because we cannot reverse
the flow of time, and for that reason, the
epistemological process is continually temporal.
There then arises a justifiable suspicion that,
according to this line of thought, Peirce might have
advocated an idealistic approach to time, something
similar to Hegel’s. The commencement of Hegelian
idealism is ‘The Idea’ of the world, which is prior to
reality. The world then is an ‘abstract’ idea at the
beginning. The unfolding process of The Idea is a
conceptualizing process, that is, the process of the
Begriff, or ‘the concept,’ as it is usually translated.
This process is wholly dependent on the work of the
Absolute Idea, Spirit, according to which the abstract
concept eventually becomes concrete, which Hegel
calls ‘historicization.’ For Hegel, historicization is
thus real time that is physically lived out. The whole
point of Hegel’s idealistic appropriation of time is
that The Idea is the form of Spirit’s possibility as it
conceives the world abstractly and then the Begriff of
the world, becomes concrete history.
Unlike Hegel, however, Peirce thinks that the idea
is a physical thing. In Peirce’s view, Hegel missed the
point by thinking that Ideas were just the form of
Spirit. Ideas would rather be the form of the ‘physical
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moment, is immediate self-consciousness (CP
6.155, my emphasis).
Personality, according to Peirce, ‘has to be lived
in time,’ but it is not ‘apprehended in an instant’ since
any finite time cannot ‘embrace it in all its fullness.’
Yet in each infinitesimal moment, personality is
present and living as ‘immediate self-consciousness.’
What exactly is the ‘immediate self-consciousness,’
then?
One possible assumption is that the immediate
self-consciousness is what Peirce mentions as
‘coordination’ or ‘connection’ of ideas (CP 6.155). It
should be noted that personality, as coordination or
connection of ideas, lives in time as well; it grows and
is subject to change. For Peirce, the temporal process
goes through the reaction of matter to mind and mind
is crystalized in that process. Two kinds of mind thus
emerge. Because ideas gain more generality, we have
the crystalized Mind. The crystalized Mind is
virtually what Peirce calls ‘a general idea.’ As time
goes by, the connection between ideas becomes more
generalized, because as ideas spread, they lose
intensity but gain generality. In other words, in the
temporal process, ideas gain the determinative power
of generality.
But what we can call person or personality has to
possess something sui generis. This is another kind of
mind. The idiosyncratic person also emerges in the
temporal flux by way of two processes of
determination. Peirce would agree that there are quick
alternations between semiotics and epistemology and
thus the modes of determination are both intensional
and extensional, in function. The semiotic
determination is the process of extension in which the
object that determines a sign transforms itself into an
objective datum for the next interpretant. The very
next interpretant becomes subjectified through the
intensional process by which mind is shaped and
grows. The problem of personal identity is thus a
complex of temporal (internal) and spatial (external)
processes.
Figure 2 (below) illustrates the point of contact in
time between the processes of semiotics and the
processes of the creation of mind. Note that the
divergence of mind and interpretant is the result of
distinguishing the two processes of determination
from one another. It does not mean that mind and
interpretant are fundamentally distinct, only that
spatialization tends to spread the processes of mind
across a limited playing of interpretation. If one folds
the diagram in half, such that interpretant and mind
touch at one point, one has a sense of the divergence
involved. It is never the case that mind and
interpretant are exactly the same, but they surely
converge in the infinitely distant future.
It should not be neglected that the possibility of
unique experience of individual mind can be
identified with Peirce’s line of thought regarding
well worthy of rumination that all the intellectual
development of man rests upon the circumstance that
all our action is subject to error’ (CP 6.86). This can
be seen as another manifestation of tychism, the
doctrine of absolute freedom. For Peirce, freedom is
experienced as real in errors we actually make. In a
similar way, we see that Peirce’s idea of temporality
is couched in terms of ‘discontinuity’ and
‘dependency,’ which are the essential features of time
(CP 6.86). What we experience as temporality is then
not continuity; the continuity itself cannot be
experienced. Rather, our experience of time is
possible somewhere around the discontinuity. The
moment of discontinuity, which lies in the present, is
thus the place where the past, which actually
happened, is distinct from the future, which is
construed as possible. The future for the present
moment is thus ‘an object of possible experience’ (CP
6.96), which should be dealt with by future
researchers. In this sense, Peirce sees time as a
‘necessitation’ dependent on law, as he says, ‘time is
the form under which logic presents itself to objective
intuition’ (CP 6.87). It is thus possible to suppose that
for the purpose of harmonization of meta-physics and
physical experience, Peirce introduced a component
that seems to be an idealistic conception of time as a
basis of our temporal experience.
6. Personality and Determination
Before turning to the topic of personality, two points
should be mentioned. Firstly, Peirce never believed
that the dualism between subject and object would
give a relevant answer to the problem of personality.
It is true that, as Vincent Colapietro observes, the
personal self of a pure kind is an illusory
phenomenon.18 Peirce rightly knows that a pure kind
of self is not possible, since self is a sign that is in the
process of developing. For that reason, secondly,
Peirce is against the Hegelian scheme of ‘absolute
personality’ (CP 2.223) ), according to which person
as the idea has an orientation that is detached from the
historicization. For Peirce, person and experience are
never separate.
Peirce’s notion of personality in ‘The Law of
Mind’ is worthy of lengthy quotation:
When we consider that, according to the
principle which we are tracing out, a
connection between ideas is itself a general
idea, and that a general idea is a living feeling,
it is plain that we have at least taken an
appreciable step toward the understanding of
personality. This personality, like any general
idea, is not a thing to be apprehended in an
instant. It has to be lived in time; nor can any
finite time embrace it in all its fullness. Yet in
each infinitesimal interval it is present and
living, though specially colored by the
immediate feelings of that moment.
Personality, so far as it is apprehended in a
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of determination. If one insists on the determination
of sign-object of persons, then one treats persons in
an extremely restricted sense.
In Peirce’s theory of determination, the presence
of personal consciousness, among other things, is
always the power of the source of the determinative
process. Personality as immediate self-consciousness
is the place where the actual functioning of
determination happens. In a moment of immediate
self-consciousness, personality is ‘objectified’ as
‘sign’ or ‘interpretant’ through the inference that
enables us to realize the particular in the realm of
becoming. Personality, at the same time,
‘subjectifies’ the most primitive real, which Peirce
calls idea, into this temporal world. This process of
subjectification enables the continuity of ideas,
through which person as idea produces mind as idea.
The work of personality is the essential operation of
the mind that directs us back to the relationship
between mind and idea, as revealed in the process of
gaining knowledge, where, in the flux of time,
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Notes
1.CP refers to six volumes of the Collected Papers of
Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Har-
vard University Press, 1931-35) edited by Charles Hart-
shorne and Paul Weiss and the seventh and eighth volumes
of the Collected Papers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Har-
vard University Press, 1958) edited by Arthur W. Burks.
The numbers indicate the appropriate volume and para-
three elements of idea. According to the second
element of idea above, the process of personality in
time involves the reaction of ‘matter.’ Against mind
that is given as a First, we have a ‘subjectified’
reactional process that occurs in and near a specific
matter, which is one’s physical body. Physical
conditions of human beings involve context, which
results in experience sui generis. The uniqueness of
the experience of persons is thus derived from the
peculiarity of situations where the mind-body
complex is located. This point is also justified from
Peirce’s sense of idea, since he uses idea not in the
substantial sense, but in the sense of an event in an
individual consciousness (CP 6.105). The personality
is in a context which involves semiotic and
epistemological processes, since self-consciousness
is knowledge of ourselves (CP 5.225). Therefore,
Hegel is denied again. The coordination of creativity,
which includes epistemological determination, is
necessarily separated from the absolute ego of pure
apperception of Hegelian sense (CP 5.235).
The significant aspect of the individual
consciousness is, then, that in the event of individual
consciousness, persons bring the past and the future
ideas together. It is notable that Peirce suggests a
potential power that leads us to the infinite distant
future ideas. The power is a ‘teleological harmony in
ideas,’ which is developmental (CP 6.156). By this
developmental teleology, in my estimation, Peirce
means a ‘personal character.’ Because of the
character, unlike uncoordinated feelings, personality
can have a ‘reference to the future’ (CP 6.157). It is
true that Peirce’s person is never reducible to the
semiotic system, because the person always overruns
it. It is always on and beyond our objectifying process
Figure 2. Contact of the Processes in Time
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18.Vincent M. Colapietro, Peirce’s Approach to the Self: A
Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity (Albany: State
University of New York, 1989), 65.
graph number of the Collected Papers. This system will be
followed in the following pages.
2.For Peirce, metaphysics is the study of ‘the general
features of reality and real objects’ (CP 6.6), which, fol-
lowing his categorical scheme, Peirce divided into three
universes, tychism, synechism, and agapism.
3.It is true that Peirce worked again on his conception of
continuity, confessing his ‘blundering treatment of
Continuity’ in ‘The Law of Mind’ (CP 6.174). The
continuity redefined, however, is also dependent on
mathematics and logic.
4.‘W’ refers to Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronologi-
cal Edition, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press published since 1982. The numbers indicate the appro-
priate volume and page number of the Writings of Charles
S. Peirce. The use of the word proposition here calls to
mind Whitehead’s unusual definition of the proposition, as
a lure for feeling. One might say something similar for
Peirce’s meaning in this famous essay.
5.Interestingly enough, in ‘The Aims of Education’ (1911),
Whitehead used the term ‘precision’ in almost same sense
as Peirce. The influence between Whitehead and Peirce is
extremely difficult to find. My interpretation on that point
is that both philosophers are minute self-solvers and find
their own way in their own language. After 1911,
references to Peirce disappeared from Whitehead’s writing.
6.Gérard Deledalle, Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs:
Essays in Comparative Semiotics (Bloomington and Indianap-
olis: Indiana University Press, 2000), 6.
7.Werner S. Pluhar, trans., Immanuel Kant, Critique of
Judgment (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1987), 15-18.
8.Kant, Critique of Judgment, 26-28.
9.See the Kant’s articulation in Critique of Judgment, 435.
10.It is worthy to note that Peirce distinguishes semiosis,
semiotic and semiology based on his division of aesthetics,
ethics and logic. This distinction between feeling, action
and logic thus allows three types of interpretant, that is
emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants. I mention
semiotics in a general sense, interchangeably with semiosis
or semiology, without recourse to this distinction.
11.The words only stand for the objects they do, and
signify the qualities they do, because they will determine,
in the mind of the auditor, corresponding signs.’ (CP 2.92);
‘A Symbol is a Representamen whose Representative char-
acter consists precisely in its being a rule that will deter-
mine its Interpretant. All words, sentences, books, and
other conventional signs are Symbols (CP 2.292).
12.Deledalle, Peirce, xiii.
13.Deledalle, Peirce, xiii.
14.In reality, the process of interpretation is possible only
by work of two determinative processes, as I shall say
below.
15.However, it should be stressed that the semiotic process
from object to interpretant is determinately continuous. In
other words, a clear-cut separation between object, sign
and interpretant is impossible, because they are processes.
The minimum successful unit of semiotics thus includes
the seamless continuum of object, sign, and interpretant.
16.By ‘thought,’ I tried to mean an activity of idea that
involves ‘physical sportings,’ without which idea cannot
be intelligible, as we shall see below.
17.This is what I expressed with ‘thought’ in the above. I
think this point reveals Peirce’s similarity to process phi-
losophy.
